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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we explore the ontological and theological ground of political institutions 
in order to then reflect upon the eschatological calling of society. The paper builds on 
Tillich’s ontological  insight  that  love does not  simply transcend justice,  but  that  it 
permeates and drives justice, that justice gives form to love’s reunion of the separated. 
This relation between love and justice is at  play in political  institutions: these unite 
human beings under forms of justice that must be transformed ever anew if they are not 
to  lose  touch  with  the  dynamic  power  of  love  and  freeze into  increasingly  unjust 
juridicalism. The modern history of Western civilisation bears witness to this ontological 
tension, and the phenomenon of globalisation is yet another instance of human society’s 
mystical  calling.  Thus,  love heads the  dynamic  movement that  transforms political 
institutions ever anew. Yet society as a whole must become conscious of its ontology for 
humanity  to  truly  reach its  eschatological  potential,  and  this  will  require  both that 
theology recovers its ground and that political theory thinks theologically.
My eyes already touch the sunny hill,
going far ahead of the road I have begun.
So we are grasped by what we cannot grasp; 
it has its inner light, even from a distance – 
and charges us, even if we do not reach it,
into something else, which, hardly sensing it,
we already are; a gesture waves us on
answering our own wave…
but what we feel is the wind in our faces. 
– A Walk, by Rainer Maria Rilke 
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In this article we shall attempt to bring together politics and theology in order to shed 
some light on the nature and evolution of political institutions.  More specifically, we 
shall  explore  the  underlying  theological  dimension  that  lies  concealed  within  the 
historical  trajectory  of  political  organisms  in  their  striving  for  justice.  From  the 
theological perspective this striving for justice is not arbitrary but springs from the roots 
of human nature seeking to fully actualise itself within the totality of the created universe 
and to fulfil its destiny within the total scheme of nature. In other words, there is an 
eschatological dimension at the heart of the social and political organisation of human 
civilisation which moves and shapes its institutions. 
On the face of it, there would seem to be no obvious connection between this 
eschatological dimension and the concerns of modern politics. Indeed, it appears wiser to 
keep religion and politics separate from one another. It is our contention, however, that, 
in the very nature of things, all political institutions have an eschatological dimension, 
that this has little to do with religious convictions, and that it operates even through what 
are normally regarded as purely secular institutions. From the theological perspective, all 
things have a religious ground.  This ground needs to be approached ontologically. No 
matter how pragmatic or ideological, any political or ethical position implies a certain 
stance towards the nature of being, and therefore any thinking about politics or ethics 
that intends to be comprehensive requires reflection on the ontological roots upon which 
it is based. 
Moreover,  the  question  of  the  nature  of  justice,  which ultimately  tests  any 
political  decision or  aspiration,  transcends any distinction between the religious and 
secular and belongs equally to both. Injustice is universally regarded as destructive, both 
collectively and individually, while justice is a quality that is universally regarded as 
naturally  belonging  to  all  human  relations.  An  analysis  of  the  history  of  political 
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institutions that fails to address the question of the nature of justice must fail to account 
for the essential social and civilising forces that are at play in shaping them.  
Yet justice itself, although intuitively recognised as a quality that ought to inform 
all political and institutional action, cannot be adequately grasped without discerning its 
metaphysical ground, and this in turn takes us into theology, into the question of the 
ultimate end of justice and the manner in which it seeks that end. This is the central 
question that will concern us in this article. In pursuing this question we hope to show 
how  the  study  of  politics  and  theology  may  be  brought  together  in  a  mutually 
illuminating relation, yet which respects the boundaries that  distinguish them so that 
neither is artificially subsumed into the other, even though we propose that there is a 
natural continuum between them.
As some of the above terminology may have already indicated, we shall  be 
building upon the work of Paul Tillich, especially his short but superb Love, Power and  
Justice.i His ontological  analysis of these three elements, along with Paul  Ricoeur’s 
discussion of the relation of love and justice, and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s insights 
into evolutionary anthropogenesis, will be related specifically to the realm of politics and 
its  institutions.  With  this  approach,  we hope to  show that  the  essential  purpose of 
political institutions is to facilitate and preserve the unity of their members under forms 
of justice that must always be transforming themselves anew through the ontological 
power of love which ultimately cannot be separated from justice. Where institutions fail 
to respond to the ontological call of love, they tend to decline into juridicalism or mere 
bureaucracy, becoming incapable of serving the ends for which they are established. That 
is, where this occurs, society tends to divide and fragment, thwarting its potential at every 
level.
By addressing the relations between politics and theology in this way, we shall 
trace  an  alignment between the  practical  call  for  political  justice which institutions 
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naturally seek, and the eschatological potential of humankind as a  whole that  is the 
essential concern of religion. If humankind is to realise its eschatological destiny, then 
theologians have  a  responsibility  to  discern  this  alignment  and  affirm their  radical 
alternative to the otherwise limited contemporary approach to politics. To a large extent, 
the modern retreat of religion into mere private conviction has contributed to this limited 
approach to politics, and so the challenge is addressed equally to theological and political 
thinking.
In order to achieve these ends, we shall begin with a discussion of the ontological 
tension between love and justice, the findings of which will then be applied to political 
institutions. A reading of recent history in the light of this will follow, and a tentative 
assessment of humankind’s calling will be proposed. This will then prompt some further 
thoughts on the  tension between political  institutions and what  we shall  call  social 
eschatology. We conclude by drawing out the contrast between this social ontology and 
modern political theory.
I. LOVE AND JUSTICE
In Love, Power and Justice, Paul Tillich explains that the relationship between love and 
justice is frequently confused. He convincingly rejects the widespread view that love 
somehow adds to justice when justice has reached its limits, that love transcends justice 
because its work starts where the work of justice ends.ii Such thinking, he laments, often 
reduces love to an emotion and justice to calculative rigidity – a concrete result of which 
can be a sentimental and irresponsible escape from the righteous demands of justice. 
Ontology, however, offers a way out of such common confusions. It recognizes 
that love, power and justice ‘precede everything that is’, an insight that philosophy has 
formulated again and again, though often in the language of mythology.iii To put it in 
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more theological and symbolic terms, ‘love, power, and justice are one in the divine 
ground.’iv They  are  united  (but  not  identical)  in  being-itself.  The  very  purpose of 
Tillich’s book is indeed to explore the relationship – the tensions within their unity – of 
these three concepts that permeate the structure of being and that are thus present in 
every encounter of man with his world.v
On the ontology of love, Tillich asserts that ‘life is being in actuality and love 
is the moving power of life,’ meaning that ‘being is not actual without the love which 
drives everything that is towards everything else that is.’vi Since all  things have their 
ground  in  the  primordial  unity  of  being,  any  separateness  must  arise  from  an 
estrangement from the original unity of being. As ‘the drive towards the unity of the 
separated’,vii love is a primordial force of being; it permeates the power of being. Put very 
briefly, being is the conquest of non-being by the reunion of the separated, and thus love 
is the foundation of being; in its conquest of separation, love affirms the prevalence of 
being by (metaphorically speaking) taking non-being into itself.viii Thus, as one of the 
‘constitutive elements’ of life, love cannot simply be ‘added to an otherwise finished 
process’ – it must be intimately present within the dynamism of this process.ix Love is not 
just an addition to justice.
Justice, Tillich then elaborates, gives form to the reunion of the separated. 
‘Everything real has a form,’ and ‘actualized being or life unites dynamics with form.’x 
Justice, Tillich deduces, ‘[gives] form to the encounter of being with being’.xi It follows 
that ‘love is the principle of justice;’ that is, ‘the justice of being is the form which is 
adequate’ to love, to ‘the drive towards the reunion of the separated’.xii Justice is thus 
driven by love, gives form to it. Love does not come after justice but permeates it. Love 
and justice are ontologically united. The test of love, therefore, is whether justice is 
achieved – justice is the sign of love in the relation of being with being. That is to say: if 
there is justice, then there must be love; if there is love, then there must be justice. Hence 
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Tillich’s concise words: ‘Love does not do more than justice demands, but love is the 
ultimate principle of justice. Love reunites; justice preserves what is to be united. It is the 
form in which and through which love performs its work.’xiii Love is formless without 
justice.
So love and justice are not identical, but they are united in the ground of being. 
They work together towards the actualisation of being, but they remain in tension within 
their ontological unity. This implies that any attempt to define justice, in other words to 
freeze it into definite formulae that prejudge a concrete situation, amounts to a move that 
is untrue to the essence of justice. Any rigid definition of ‘justice’ immediately loses 
touch with love – and it thereby immediately loses touch with justice itself. For love 
continues its conquest of the separated, and thus continuously transforms justice anew. 
Justice is therefore essentially dynamic (Tillich uses the term ‘creative’).xiv Hence as soon 
as justice is fixed, it looses touch with its ontological ground, and, over time, an ageing 
formulation of justice gradually becomes ever more unjust.
Tillich’s reflections are of course firmly rooted in the Western theological tradition. It is 
therefore not surprising that  a  theologian and philosopher such as Paul  Ricoeur, for 
instance, follows a line of thinking that is sympathetic to Tillich’s. A brief summary of 
Ricoeur’s thoughts in his ‘Love and Justice’ may help enrich the above analysis.xv 
After remarking on the inadequacies of an analytic approach to grasping the 
nature of love, and on the radical discontinuities between love and justice, Ricoeur offers 
to  build  a  bridge over  their  dissimilarity  by discussing the  seemingly incompatible 
Christian commandments to love one’s enemies and to do to others what you would have 
them do unto you (the ‘golden rule’). The ‘hyperethical’ commandment to love one’s 
enemies, Ricoeur explains, ‘develops a logic of superabundance’ that seems at odds with 
the ‘logic of equivalence’ and reciprocity embodied in the golden rule –  just as it is 
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embodied in contemporary discourses on justice.xvi Nevertheless, Ricoeur proposes an 
interpretation that refuses their strict incompatibility:
The commandment of love does not abolish the golden rule but instead reinterprets 
it  in terms of generosity, and thereby makes not just possible but necessary an 
application of the commandment whereby, owing to its hyperethical status, it does 
not accede to the ethical sphere except at the price of paradoxical and extreme 
forms of behaviour, those forms which are in fact recommended in the wake of the 
new commandment.xvii
Ricoeur  then  quotes  Luke  6:27-30  to  list  these  paradoxical  forms  of  behaviour 
recommended by the hyperethical commandment to love, such as: doing good to those 
that hate you, praying for those that abuse you, turning the other cheek, giving your coat 
to he who takes away your cloak, and so on.
Without the commandment to love, Ricoeur contends, ‘the golden rule would 
be constantly drawn in the direction of a utilitarian maxim whose formula is Do ut des: I 
give so that  you will give.’xviii The hyperethical commandment to love does not really 
criticise  the  logic  of  equivalence of  the  golden rule,  but  its  perverse,  profit-driven 
interpretation.xix Put in broader terms, love is not critical of distributive or reciprocal 
justice, but of its self-interested interpretation. Without love, justice tends to be drawn 
into cold calculations based on rigid rules. When love informs justice, however, it drives 
justice to its limits, where it is enveloped by love’s logic of superabundance and leads to 
pioneering forms of behaviour. Hence the golden rule is truly just only when informed by 
love – not when it is interpreted as cold, calculative, utilitarian reciprocity.
Ricoeur  concludes that  justice is  ‘the necessary medium of love; precisely 
because love is hypermoral, it enters the practical and ethical sphere only under the aegis 
of justice’.xx But love remains ‘hyperethical’, that is, beyond, just ahead of ethics itself. It 
enters ethics in the form of justice, and yet works for justice to transform justice. The 
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parallels  with  Tillich  are  obvious.  Neither  of  them sees love  and  justice  as  fully 
separated, although both maintain a creative tension between them. They both talk of 
love requiring the mediation of justice for its dynamism to inform the relationship of one 
being with another. Justice is a  form taken by love, and yet love keeps working just 
beyond it. 
To summarise what has been established so far, love does not simply transcend justice. 
Love drives towards the unity of the separated, and justice holds the reunited together by 
giving a form to the reunion, by acknowledging each reciprocal claim to being. But love 
carries on working for broader reunion of the still  separated. Thus love persistently 
requires justice to adopt new forms, to push itself to its limits and transform itself anew. 
Accordingly, old forms of justice can become inadequate to new situations, so justice 
must remain dynamic and aware of its ontological basis if it  is to avoid the risk of 
negating itself. 
II. THE ONTOLOGY OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
If love and justice are grounded in the very texture of being and work together towards 
its actualisation, then they must be just as ontologically essential to the actualisation of 
political organisms. Tillich indeed affirms that 
Every organism, natural as well as social, is a power of being and a bearer of an 
intrinsic claim for justice because it is based on some form of reuniting love. It 
removes as organism the separatedness of some parts of the world.xxi 
But Tillich draws an important distinction between the unity of biological organisms and 
that of social organisms – a distinction more fully elaborated by Teilhard de Chardin 
below. Social  organisms are different from natural  ones in that  the individuals who 
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constitute them remain independent and ‘can resist the unity of the social organism to 
which they belong’, whereas ‘in a biological organism the parts are nothing without the 
whole to which they belong.’xxii Social and political organisms, on the other hand, are 
united  by love in  forms of  justice  that  relate  the  autonomy of the  individual  to  a 
collective perception of justice.
Individual  members are united by the foundational values of their political 
body. Tillich calls the communal power of being that unites human beings ‘the spirit of 
the group’, and sees it ‘expressed in all its utterances, in its laws and institutions, in its 
symbols and myths, in its ethical and cultural forms’.xxiii In these is visible the love that 
unites and binds a community together.xxiv Love brings together individual members into 
political  organisms  that  in  turn  embody the  values  that  the  group  considers  just; 
moreover, each individual member of the social group wholly embodies these values as a 
free person in themselves. Laws, institutions, founding myths and ethical values reflect 
and inform a social groups’ collective understanding of justice. They are the form that 
love takes in society. They symbolise what unites the beings whose separation has been 
conquered. 
Furthermore, when the ‘spirit’ of a group is strong and its political institutions 
are widely perceived as just, then civilisation is given the space it needs to flourish. The 
arts, culture, science and trade all thrive when beneficial common values are respected, 
when individual citizens are united under a shared vision of justice. And each individual 
member that  embraces the spirit  of the group, making it  their own, participates and 
contributes to the development of their civilisation. Individuals find a place within the 
group in which their being is given space to actualise itself in a way that enriches the 
wider community. 
In the case of the most powerful political organisms in history, Tillich adds, the 
consciousness of the power of their spirit turns into ‘the feeling of a special vocation’, 
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into a ‘vocational consciousness’.xxv The spirit of these civilisations radiates far into ‘the 
larger space of mankind’ and leaves an important legacy to humanity.xxvi Tillich then lists 
some examples of the vocational consciousness of historic civilisations, among which are 
law and order  from Rome, and a  structure  for  the united Christian  body from the 
medieval German Empire.xxvii 
He further insists that empires do not only subject, but they also unite, thus 
‘both  love  and  justice  are  actual’  in  the  laws  that  express  their  vocational 
consciousness.xxviii If subjects stop acknowledging (even if only silently) that they are 
‘participants of a superior power of meaning and being’, then the strength and unity of 
the empire evaporates, and its civilisation decays and dies.xxix The strength of a political 
organism depends on its members recognising the power of its vocational consciousness 
and contributing to  it.  In  this  acknowledgement,  separate  members are  united in  a 
common spirit, and the justice that expresses this spirit is respected.
Furthermore, as ‘power is real only in […] the encounter with other bearers of 
power,’  it  is  no  surprise  that  great  civilisations  are  built  through  frictions  with 
neighbouring contenders.xxx As a social group encounters another, there is ‘pushing ahead 
and withdrawing, […]  absorbing and throwing out’.xxxi This  struggle determines the 
relative power of each group, the recognition of the relative strength of each group’s 
spirit  and vocational consciousness –  and it  is continuously renegotiated. Obviously, 
Tillich  remarks,  ‘these encounters are  the basic  material  of history.  In  them man’s 
political destiny is decided.’xxxii History narrates the struggle for the reunion of separated 
human beings under the spirit of great civilisations. 
Still, love has not (yet) united the whole of humanity. The civilisations that it 
did establish rose and fell, though they did leave lasting legacies to humankind. They 
typically  lost  their  dynamism  and  froze  within  ageing  forms  of  justice.  But  love 
continued its work and gave birth to new forms of justice. More recently, what has been 
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called globalisation certainly suggests that  love keeps pulling ahead,  calling human 
beings to broader, deeper reunion with other human beings. Love keeps pulling political 
institutions from ahead, guiding humankind towards the fulfilment of its destiny. 
Before  these  insights  can  be  used  to  better  grasp  the  political  situation  in  which 
humankind currently finds itself, a theme in Tillich’s work that is more prominent in The 
Courage to Be and in Systematic Theology ought to be touched upon first, namely: the 
ontological polarity between individualisation and participation.xxxiii An understanding of 
this polarity will help explain the process whereby political institutions can disintegrate.
In a nutshell, the self-affirmation of a human being has two sides that reflect 
this ontological polarity. On the one hand, there is ‘the affirmation of the self as self; that 
is  of  a  separated,  self-centered,  individualized,  incomparable,  free,  self-determining 
self’.xxxiv But on the other, ‘the self is self only because it has a world […] to which it 
belongs and from which it is separated at the same time;’ in other words, the self is self 
only  because  it  participates  in  the  world.xxxv There  can  be  ‘no  person  without  an 
encounter with other persons. Persons can grow only in the communion of personal 
encounter.  Individualization  and  participation  are  interdependent  on  all  levels  of 
being.’xxxvi 
But  this does not mean that  there exists an  everlasting, perfectly balanced 
harmony between these two interdependent poles. Tillich indeed sees the history of the 
relationship between social groups and their individual members as a constant oscillation 
between  individualisation  and  participation.xxxvii When  participation  is  particularly 
important, Tillich talks of a ‘collectivist society’, a society ‘in which the existence and 
life of the individual are determined by the existence and institutions of the group’.xxxviii 
Such a society tends to lead to conformist attitude and a complete identification of the 
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individual with the spirit of his society; but eventually, the very danger of the individual 
losing his self stimulates protest against excessive collectivism.xxxix
At the other extreme of the ontological  polarity,  ‘individualism is the self-
affirmation of the individual self as individual self without regard to its participation in 
its world.’xl The danger here comes from the complete isolation of the individual from his 
now meaningless world of empty selves, a situation that Tillich discusses at length in his 
outline of Existentialism; this can then kindle a  totalitarian  reaction for a  return  to 
collectivism.xli 
Hence,  as  already  observed,  human  beings vacillate  between the  poles  of 
individualisation and participation. The tension between these poles thus plays itself out 
in  human history.  The great  civilisations of humankind united their members under 
forms of justice that struck a provisional balance between these poles. But love always 
continued  its  work  and  continuously  transformed  justice  anew,  in  so  doing  also 
transforming  the  adequate  balance  between  the  poles  of  individualisation  and 
participation. History narrates how those institutions that did not keep in touch with this 
transformation of justice eventually lost the respect and the credibility of their members.
III. A READING OF CONTEMPORARY HISTORY
In light of the above ontological insights, it is worth gazing back a few centuries in order 
to better grasp the salient features of the ontological climate which humankind finds itself 
in today. During the Middle Ages, Catholic Christianity reached the farthest confines of 
Western Europe and formed a  single body that  gathered its growing flock under its 
religious and political power (the distinction between which was far less obvious then 
than it is today). But Catholicism tended toward a legalistic form of collectivism. It ruled 
in the name of universal laws and decrees that increasingly lost touch with the dynamism 
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that moved the members of its body. As already observed, such tendency to juridicalism 
is a danger inherent within any institution or any political system.
The Reformation was an almost natural  reaction to this situation. It  shifted 
power away from the conformist Church and towards the individual. From now on, the 
individual human being would become empowered to use his reasoning in order to make 
sense of the big questions of life.xlii He would take increasing control of the affirmation of 
his being. At first, this meant translating the Bible and making Scripture accessible to the 
people. But the Catholic Church persisted in its rigid legalism, thereby further fuelling 
the drive towards individualisation and the concomitant de-legitimisation of the Church’s 
spiritual power. The following centuries thus saw the growth and spread of the empirical 
sciences, Enlightenment philosophy, free enterprise and the industrial revolution – all of 
which were inspired by the drive to empower the individual.
In due course, in the political sphere, this movement led to the reform of social 
institutions and the emergence of democracy. In democracy, each individual participant 
is given the (indirect) power to make the laws that bind the political group together; love 
unites separated  human  beings under  a  new form of social  justice that  reflects the 
individual’s desire for freedom, equality and self-determination. The history of the last 
two centuries narrates how, over time, these democratic values captivated an increasing 
number of social groups, to the point that liberal democracy is considered by some today 
as the only alternative form of justice that can successfully bring human beings together. 
The form of justice embodied by what could be called ‘Western civilisation’ 
unites individual citizens in a common love of values such as democracy, free market 
economics, the rule of law and human rights, the purpose of all of which is to empower 
and protect the individual. These values animate the spirit of ‘Western civilisation’ and 
inform its vocational consciousness. But the point is that what really started as a rejection 
of Church legalism and collectivist absolutism eventually developed into the common 
Love, Justice, and Social Eschatology
spirit,  the  common vocational  consciousness that  unites  democratic  countries  under 
forms of justice that are centred around the individual.
However, this very broad drive towards the empowerment of the individual did 
not advance in a smooth or uniform fashion. It continuously struggled and defined itself 
against initially religious and later secular types of collectivist absolutism. For a start, the 
withering away of the power of the Church came with the profusion of nascent nation-
states, each gradually taking over the administrative running of given territories from the 
clergy. Each of these states tried to unite, under new and increasingly secular forms of 
justice, sections of a Christian population that were losing their medieval sense of unity. 
But these states also fought against one another. 
Moreover, the broader struggle, between the drive towards the empowerment of 
the individual and the stubborn resistance against it by collectivist absolutism, was in 
effect embodied by different states at different times, depending on the allegiance of their 
political leaders. For a while, the Church continued to defend its fragmenting power with 
the help of rulers that were sympathetic to its cause. But later on, when the Church was 
weakened in its defence of religious collectivism, the drive towards individualisation had 
now to carry on its struggle against  secular  types of collectivist absolutism – such as 
fascism, communism, and other secular versions of authoritarian collectivism.
The  separated  people  of  formerly Catholic  Europe were  only to  regain  a 
semblance of their medieval unity, under liberal democratic forms of justice, around the 
turn of the twenty-first century. It took a long struggle for the new form of justice to 
defeat its collectivist foes and overcome much of the separation of Christians that this 
collectivist attitude was partly responsible for. But in time, when the Soviet vocational 
consciousness collapsed within its crumbling empire, the vocational consciousness of 
America and its Western civilisation saw itself as the only remaining form of justice 
through which the separation of all human beings could ultimately be conquered. The 
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collapse of Communism was less of a  direct  victory for  liberal  democracy than an 
internal breakdown of a form of justice that had fallen into rigid legalism and collectivist 
absolutism. Even so, Western civilisation saw its spirit, its vision and its institutions as 
the embodiment of the sole contender for the reunion of humankind. Many have since 
been expressing the hope that the globalisation of Western values would accomplish just 
that. 
IV. THE CALLING OF HUMAN SOCIETY
But will it? Love drives towards the reunion of the separated, and this would imply that 
it  does drive towards the reunion of humankind. Could the next form of justice for 
humankind be hinted at by the process of globalisation? Any speculation regarding the 
future is of course only tentative, but there is no reason why the next form of justice 
should not be glimpsed from elements of the current human situation. The following are 
therefore just a few modest thoughts on the subject, though they hope to be faithfully 
grounded in the fundamental currents presently driving humankind towards its future. 
The last century certainly witnessed the birth and growth of international and 
even global institutions, radical improvements in methods of communication, and record 
intensification of international trade, foreign investments and migration. With these also 
came  increasing  contacts  between  different  cultures  –  some  leading  to  fruitful 
combinations,  others  to  sometimes  violent  aversions.  But  the  broad  process  of 
globalisation is clearly visible in political, economic, and cultural realms.
In the meantime, and perhaps somewhat more recently, unease with various 
facets and consequences of this broad movement has also become widespread. The ‘anti-
globalisation’ or ‘alter-globalisation’ movement is constituted by people with incredibly 
varied  agendas:  some  reject  the  economic  exploitation  of  inconsiderate  economic 
Love, Justice, and Social Eschatology
liberalism, others are  fighting for a  more ecologically sustainable way of living, or 
against genetic manipulation of crops, or for the elimination of protectionist policies in 
agriculture,  and others still  want to  replace representative democracy by alternative 
political systems. Some factions indeed have aims that would conflict with the aims of 
other factions within the ‘alter-globalisation’ movement. 
What  all  share,  however,  is  a  growing  sense  of  humanity  that  remains 
unarticulated.xliii All want a fairer, peaceful and more sustainable global economy. They 
are brought together through a dislike of some of the consequences of globalisation, even 
though they have largely failed to articulate a common vision in response.xliv At the same 
time,  the very globalisation that  they are  unhappy about  also  mirrors  humankind’s 
groping towards this same sense of humanity. The processes of globalisation encourage 
the participation of more human beings in a global culture, a global market, and in ever 
more inclusive international organisations. So, both the progressive political, economic 
and cultural amalgamation of humanity  and  the uneasy reactions against some of its 
aspects are indicators of an ontological movement, driven by love, towards a new and as 
yet unknown form of justice. The current human challenge is to articulate, to formulate 
this dawning future. 
In this regard, it is helpful to consider Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s work in parallel to 
these insights inspired by Tillich.xlv For Teilhard, the long evolutionary emergence of life 
on earth has been a movement towards higher and higher orders of unified complexity, a 
process of  differentiation and  unification.  This  has  always  been in  the  direction of 
consciousness,  and  with  humankind  consciousness at  last  reaches the  stage of  self-
reflection, and with self-reflection comes the power to shape the future of the species. 
But  this  is  possible  only  through  the  unification  of  thought  and  the  full 
socialisation of humankind. 
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By virtue of the emergence of Thought a special and novel environment has been 
evolved  among  human  individuals  within  which  they  acquire  the  faculty  of 
associating together, and reacting upon one another, no longer primarily for the 
preservation and continuance of the species but  for the creation of a  common 
consciousness.xlvi
This  common  consciousness,  however,  does  not  subsume  the  individual  into  an 
anonymous collective, which would be a  regressive step, but  it  emerges through the 
communion of what is most unique in each individual:
In such an environment the differentiation born of union may act upon that which 
is most unique and incommunicable in the individual, namely his personality. Thus 
socialization, whose hour seems to have sounded for Mankind, does not by any 
means signify the ending of the Era of the Individual upon earth, but far more its 
beginning.xlvii
Up till  now human  socialization  has  taken  the  form of  harnessing the  mechanical 
energies of the earth, the stage of any species ensuring its biological survival, while the 
phase which Teilhard sees emerging now shifts from the physical or biological to the 
sphere of thought or consciousness, manifesting in the quest for knowledge, in culture 
and  specifically  in  competing  political  ideologies.  These  competing  ideologies  are 
essentially struggles between two poles – individualism and collectivism. This struggle 
can be resolved only through the synthesis of both into a higher unity: ‘All that matters at 
this crucial moment is that the massing together of individualities should not take the 
form of a  functional and enforced mechanization of human energies (the totalitarian 
principle), but of a ‘conspiracy’ informed with love.’xlviii Teilhard understands love as the 
principle of life and evolution emerging at the level of consciousness that both unites and 
individuates,  gathering individuals  together  in  order  that  they should  become most 
themselves through extending their participation within the totality of nature. It is only 
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through the principle of love that the ethical dimension of humanity emerges in its full 
magnitude. As with Tillich, Teilhard understands love as the only power that can unite 
humankind in freedom:
Love has always been carefully eliminated from realist and positivist concepts of 
the  world;  but  sooner  or  later  we  shall  have  to  acknowledge  that  it  is  the 
fundamental impulse of Life, or, if you prefer, the one natural medium in which the 
rising course of evolution can proceed. With love omitted there is truly nothing 
ahead of us except the forbidding prospect of standardization and enslavement – 
the doom of ants and termites. It is through love and within love that we must look 
for  the  deepening  of  our  deepest  self,  in  the  life-giving  coming  together  of 
humankind. Love is the free and imaginative outpouring of the spirit  over all 
unexplored paths. It links those who love in bonds that unite but do not confound, 
causing  them  to  discover  in  their  mutual  contact  an  exaltation  capable, 
incomparably more than any arrogance of solitude, of arousing in the heart of their 
being all that they possess of uniqueness and creative power.xlix
Thus for Teilhard, the current era – which for him spans at least as far back as 
Ancient Greece – is witnessing the still tentative beginning of the socialisation of man; 
and it is in this vast historical context that the challenge to articulate the nascent sense of 
humanity must be located. In their increasing interactions with ever more – and ever 
more distant – neighbours, human beings are forming political structures that are ever 
more highly ‘socialised’.l Teilhard insists that the process that drives this socialisation 
‘coincides  exactly,  in  its  continuation,  with  the  process,  already  independently 
recognised, of cephalisation’.li That is, the movement that draws human beings together 
socially,  to  form  more  and  more  complex  political  institutions,  is  the  very  same 
movement ‘that covers the whole biological and atomic history of the earth’.lii 
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Teilhard’s perspective places the phenomenon of globalisation (including its 
critics) in this very broad evolutionary context.liii By extrapolating the ‘historical reality’ 
of ‘cerebralisation’ and ‘anthropogenesis’, he can assert that the future is ‘still open to 
collective  cerebralisation  or  socialisation’,  which  reveals  an  ‘immense,  boundless, 
horizon’.liv ‘Ahead of us’, therefore, ‘there must be a Super-humanity,’lv a form of society 
that will unite the diversity of human beings.lvi At that eschaton, the personal and the 
collective  –  individualisation  and  participation  –  will  have  been  transformed, 
transcended and fulfilled.lvii But  in  the meantime, globalisation plays its  part  in  this 
colossal  historical  movement:  it  bears  witness  to  the  collective  cerebralisation  of 
humanity.lviii 
Finally, for Teilhard just as for Tillich, ‘it is love that heads this movement;’lix 
it is love that drives towards the unity of the separated. But the higher social form that 
humanity is groping towards must be one that  balances and transcends the poles of 
individualisation and participation. So far, it seems that the political form that has best 
addressed the tension between these poles is democracy. Yet if liberal democracy – and 
its global exportation – was to be considered as the final form of social justice, it would 
fall into the old trap of rigid legalism and lose touch with the essential dynamism that 
initially informed it. Love continues to transform justice and thus calls for the reform of 
political  institutions.  Nonetheless,  democracy  does  take  part  in  humanity’s 
transformation towards Super-humanity. In other words, democracy bears witness to the 
eschatological calling of humanity. 
V. THE TENSION BETWEEN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL 
ESCHATOLOGY
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History  thus  confirms what  ontology suggests.  All  institutions tend  to  decline  into 
juridicalism, into rigid legalism or fixity. The form of justice that they embody risks 
losing touch with the ‘creative’ or ‘dynamic’ justice that love calls for in every new 
situation.  As  love  conquers  separation,  it  transforms justice  (and  thus  the  balance 
between individualisation and participation) to preserve what is being united. The justice 
that continually gives love its form is therefore innovative and dynamic. Institutions, 
however, tend to reflect a form of justice that was once adequate but that always tends to 
complacently become increasingly inadequate. 
If institutions fail to constantly reform themselves anew in order to reflect new 
forms of justice, they eventually fail to fulfil their very mission: they slip into legalism 
and bureaucracy and rely on fixed interpretations of ageing laws, the application of 
which, at  some point, leads to injustice and disunity in the transformed present. An 
institution that has thus lost touch with the form of justice that unites its members faces 
decline and eventual death. If it fails to transform itself, it loses its claim to embody the 
unity of its members, and in due course gets replaced by another institution that better 
represents the transformed spirit of the group. 
The  risk  of  becoming inadequate  to  the  changing  demands  of  justice,  of 
freezing into either collectivism or individualism, is a real risk faced by all institutions 
(though perhaps to different degrees). Civil or religious, democratic or authoritarian, 
legalism can stifle any of them. It  suffocated the medieval Church, it  suffocated the 
Communist revolution, and it can just as easily suffocate a democratic state. It is not 
because democracy is formally designed to constitutionally reflect the changing will of 
its members that its legislation is guaranteed to reflect the ongoing transformation of 
justice.lx
The very process of drawing legislation is, to some extent, already caught up in 
the logic that leads to legal rigidity and fixity. What is just in a concrete situation cannot 
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be defined a priori by some positive universal law. Tillich indeed declares that ‘there are 
no principles which could be applied mechanically and which would guarantee that 
justice is done.’lxi Thus the highest level of justice, of ‘transforming or creative justice’, is 
based on the understanding that ‘intrinsic justice is dynamic’ and that, therefore, ‘as such 
it cannot be defined in definite terms.’lxii Hence, fixed legislation that is believed to inform 
all concrete situations ex ante is ultimately unjust. True justice transforms itself in every 
new situation. 
This means that at the very least, political institutions cannot claim to enact a 
form of justice that is universally and eternally fixed. In its perpetual drive towards the 
reunion of the separated, love is persistently moving beyond the forms of justice that it 
takes;  political  institutions  must  either  continuously  reform  to  reflect  this  ever-
transformed justice, or face decay and replacement by an institution that will. One of the 
advantages of democracy is that, to the extent that it does reflect the dynamic values that 
unite its people, it is open to reform. It is theoretically designed to reflect and express the 
love and the form of justice that unite the human beings that participate in it. But to 
remain just, it must keep paying attention to its reformers and be willing to reconsider 
every one of its fixed, written laws.  
Idealistic  reformers,  philosophers  and  prophets  have  always  existed  and 
animated society. Every civilisation was formed by visionaries, and within them there 
were always thinkers calling for an even ‘better’ society, for political reform to fulfil an 
even higher degree of justice. These ideals constantly call humankind forward –  the 
challenge is to actualise them. Love calls for reform, but political institutions sometimes 
fail to take up the challenge and freeze into juridicalism. Tillich thus suggests that an 
intricate and permanently shifting balance needs to be maintained between dynamism 
and form: love needs to build upon some form of justice in order to reach beyond it, 
though the risk is that this form may suppress the dynamic element of love.lxiii Failure to 
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grasp the eschatological  ideal,  however, ends in  juridicalism and a  deferring of the 
actualisation of the potential of (both individual and social) beings.
At stake here is nothing less than the full actualisation of the potential of being-
itself, the eschatological fulfilment of Creation. It is no coincidence that idealists portray 
their vision as the formula for the salvation of humankind from its predicament: their 
vision is informed by the very power which drives justice towards the full reunion of the 
separated. This primordial force of being pulls humankind and its institutions towards 
the eschaton and the actualisation of universal love. The historical evolution of political 
institutions thus bears witness to the progressive transformation of justice, driven by love, 
towards its eschatological fulfilment.
VI. SOCIAL ONTOLOGY AND MODERN POLITICAL THEORY
The above discussion has important implications for contemporary political theory. More 
specifically, it puts forth an understanding of humanity that is radically different to the 
one that classic modern political theory (that is, political theory since the Renaissance but 
excluding  ‘post-modern’  variants)lxiv assumes.  As  John  Milbank  and  William  T. 
Cavanaugh  have  shown,  modern  political  theory  is  founded  upon  an  ontological 
assumption of a primary state of violence.lxv In a word, a ‘state of nature’ is assumed in 
which humans tend to get into conflict with one another; but reason brings these warring 
individuals into agreeing over a social contract whereby the monopoly of force is granted 
to a central authority whose task becomes the preservation of peace.lxvi It is through this 
contracted social body that humankind is to be saved from endless chaos and conflict. 
Thus, the remedy for the salvation of humankind follows logically from the 
original  ‘mythological’  assumption about  human  nature  and  ‘the  origins of  human 
conflict’.lxvii In more general terms, a statement on the ideal formula for the salvation of 
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humankind is already included in any founding myth. Accordingly, if one assumes a 
state of primordial violence, then the creation of a strong but static state does appear to 
be the natural option to minimise and police conflict.lxviii But if, instead, a founding myth 
narrates the disruption from an original unity, then the salvation of humankind is to be 
enacted by progressively restoring this original unity.lxix Cavanaugh identifies the former 
myth with modern political theory and the latter with Christianity – though the ontology 
of a disrupted unity need not be confined solely to Christianity. 
Still,  for  Cavanaugh,  whereas  the  soteriology  of  modern  political  theory 
institutes  a  strong central  authority  to  maintain  order  among ontologically  distinct 
individuals, that of Christianity calls for the participation of all separated beings in the 
body of Christ.lxx Cavanaugh notes that ‘both soteriologies pursue peace and an end to 
divisions by the enactment of a social body.’lxxi But, while in one case humanity is to be 
saved by handing over the monopoly of legitimate force to a centralised political body, in 
the other salvation depends on mutual participation, driven by love, in a social body that 
recovers humankind’s primordial unity. The ontology presented in this article obviously 
accords with what Cavanaugh identifies as the Christian ontology, and is thus radically 
dissimilar from that of contemporary political theory.
Cavanaugh is of course aware that the Church has often failed to present itself 
as the alternative ontology and soteriology to the state that it actually signifies.lxxii On the 
face of it, the Church seems to have failed in its mission precisely by falling into the trap 
of juridicalism, by compromising with imperial power and by deferring its ideal beyond 
Creation. So the point is certainly not to call for the Church to reclaim the political power 
it once abused, but for it to stop acknowledging the legitimacy of the state’s mythology 
and soteriology.lxxiii This also requires theologians to recover, rethink and shamelessly 
present  the  theology  that  was  lost  in  Christianity’s  slow  transition  to  modernity. 
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Somewhere in history, the ontology of love that was central to Christianity was displaced 
by the secular ideology of modernity.
On this topic, the work of Louis Dupré is especially helpful: he identifies the 
beginning of the breaking down of the ‘ontotheological synthesis’ that prevailed up to the 
Reformation with the split between nature and grace.lxxiv That is, a fateful dualism was 
allowed to emerge when God as One, as immanent within His intelligent Creation was 
replaced by God the external moral Lawmaker whose Will must be obeyed by His sinful 
individual  subjects.lxxv The  Creation thus  became separated  from its  Creator.  God’s 
relationship to human beings became one of required obedience to unquestionable laws. 
The  Creation  was  no  longer  understood  as  permeated  by  God’s  immanent  love, 
providence and grace – instead, it became the ground for a struggle between good and 
evil, victory in which demanded obedience to the Divine Will. Love and idealism were 
displaced by conflict and law. In other words, here is visible, yet again, the tension 
between love and juridicalism. 
A  comparison  of  the  modern  state  with  this  dictatorial  and  moralistic 
conception  of  God  reveals  striking  similarities.  For  instance,  the  modern  state’s 
moralising, its structure of rewards and punishments and its expectation of submission to 
its laws all mirror the behaviour of this juridical misperception of God. That is to say, it 
would seem that  the juridicalist theology that displaced the ontotheological synthesis 
within Christianity  also  permeates the  secular  view of nature  and thus  informs the 
modern  image  of  the  state.  Even  though  modernity  portrays  itself  as  opposing  a 
theological conception of things, it is actually adopting the same relation to Creation and 
thus a similar recipe for salvation as the juridicalist theology that it pretends to react 
against in the name of reason. This suggests that the Church and the theology that has 
infused it since the end of the Middle Ages in effect brought about the modern secular 
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state. And this, it turns out, would concur with Cavanaugh’s perspective of the modern 
state as a parody or ‘simulacrum’ of the body of Christ.lxxvi 
But  this  also  means  that  the  responsibility  for  modern  political  theory’s 
ontologically  myopic  mythology  and  soteriology  rests  not  so  much  on  modern 
philosophy as on the Church and its theology. With the breakdown of the ontotheological 
synthesis,  theology  failed  to  criticise  modern  political  philosophy  from  its  true 
ontological ground, and the Church conceded its eventual relegation to the private and 
subjective realm of the soul. For Milbank and Cavanaugh, therefore, the Church today 
must question modernity’s presumption of an initial state of violence, against which it 
must then reaffirm the ‘counter-ontology’lxxvii and ‘counter-politics’lxxviii of love that  it 
truly signifies. 
This, however, is not quite strong enough, because as Dupré shows, theology 
itself has already lost its true ground. What is called for is for the full ontological ground 
of politics to be perceived by society as a whole. It is about human society discerning the 
present immanence of God, not about appealing to a lost ideal or to a God conceived of 
as an outside agency. Thus it is not a question of competing doctrines and religions, but it 
is about the very nature of things, about how things are already underway – whether this 
is really seen to be so or not. Nor is it so much about the formal relation between religion 
and state: it is about society discerning its true ground and embracing its call in all its 
social  institutions.  These  institutions  –  be  they  church,  state,  local,  national  or 
international – must keep reforming themselves anew if they are not to entrap humanity 
in ageing forms of justice. What is called for is not some ‘counter’ ontology in society 
but social ontology per se. And ontology is not just another ‘belief-system’ that competes 
for public attention in the political sphere, but is concerned with the very nature of being 
and becoming. 
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The decline into juridicalism is a reminder of the inadequacy of contemporary 
thinking, both within secular circles and within Christianity. If justice is not actualised, it 
is because it is not yet fully understood, because society as a whole does not yet perceive 
the ontological and theological ground of love and justice which permeates everything in 
nature. And yet humanity must reflect upon and become conscious of its calling for this 
calling to be fulfilled. In Teilhard’s words, the human condition is ‘to see or to perish.’lxxix 
But for humanity to see and fully give form to the political institutions that love calls it 
to,  theology must  reclaim  its  voice  and  society  must  learn  to  hear  it  again.  The 
responsibility to recover and formulate humanity’s reflection on the authentic nature of 
things lies primarily with theology, though it also calls for political philosophy to think 
theologically. In other words, for human society as a whole to become fully conscious of 
its ontological ground in love and justice, for humankind to become aware of and thus 
fulfil its eschatological potential, theology and political philosophy must embrace each 
other  in  thinking  about  society,  and  society  as  a  whole  must  reflect  upon  itself 
theologically.
Human civilisation has a mystical calling, a destiny, which is the reunion of the 
separated in the mystical body of Christ. As Teilhard observed, the entire evolutionary 
process  of  nature  is  revealing  an  ascent  from mere  scattered  multiplicity  towards 
complex unity, and finally the conscious union of all things in God as the consummation 
of the Creation. This is the form which all societies ultimately seek to actualise, the true 
ground of all ideology. All progress is ultimately grounded in the pull in that direction. 
The flaws or inadequacies of society at any time are a recognition of a falling short from 
this call. Yet in the bearing witness of political institutions to the evolution of justice, this 
call is nevertheless revealed. The task of humankind is to become conscious of this call 
and to thus fully actualise it in its institutions. 
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